simone/clienthub
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
313 Commits 1 Branch 1 Tag
0aad9caf4642d881e5784ca1e6e0cddb8cf756b8
Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
simone 8158038145 feat(auth): gate OTP email sul portale cliente (v2.3 Phases 23-25) 
Il portale /client/<slug> era protetto dal solo token in URL: chiunque
ricevesse o intercettasse il link entrava, per sempre, senza identificarsi.
Ora l'admin registra le email autorizzate per cliente e il cliente si
identifica con un codice usa-e-getta prima di vedere qualsiasi dato.

- Resend 6.18.1 + src/lib/mailer.ts (Result tipizzato, mai catch silenzioso)
- migration 0015 (gia applicata a prod): client_emails, otp_codes,
  clients.sessions_valid_from. Additiva pura, conteggi verificati pre/post
- admin: sezione "Accessi al portale" in /admin/clients/[id] con whitelist
  e revoca sessioni in blocco
- gate: codice 6 cifre CSPRNG, hash SHA-256 (mai il codice in chiaro),
  TTL 15 min, max 5 tentativi, rate limit su entrambi gli endpoint,
  risposta identica per email in whitelist e non (no enumeration)
- sessione: cookie HMAC per-cliente, 90 giorni, httpOnly/secure/lax

Il gate sta in cima alla page, NON nel layout: nell'App Router il segmento
page viene renderizzato in parallelo al layout, quindi gattare nel layout
nascondeva la dashboard a schermo ma lasciava fasi, task e pagamenti nel
payload RSC dell'HTML (46907 byte -> 17594 dopo il fix). Verificato.

Verifica: build OK, 9/9 test E2E in locale contro il DB di produzione.

NON DEPLOYARE prima di: RESEND_API_KEY+RESEND_FROM su Coolify e whitelist
popolata per i 3 clienti reali (oggi vuota) - altrimenti il gate li chiude
fuori dal loro portale. Checklist in .planning/STATE.md.

SEND-01/02 (invio preventivo via email) rinviati a v2.4 su richiesta.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-29 12:10:33 +02:00
simone a478462aa4 security: full hardening pass — auth guards, rate limiting, headers, internal secret 
- Add requireAdmin() to all unprotected admin server actions
  (clients/new, clients/[id], timer-actions — 17 functions total)
- Protect /api/internal/* endpoints with X-Internal-Secret header
  (proxy.ts sends it; routes reject requests without it)
- Randomize auto-generated client slugs with 4-char suffix
  to prevent enumeration via predictable name-based slugs
- Add in-memory rate limiting to /api/client/approve (20/min)
  and /api/client/comment (10/min) per IP
- Add security headers: X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options,
  Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, X-DNS-Prefetch-Control
- Reduce JWT session from 30 days to 7 days with daily rotation
- Remove hardcoded NEXTAUTH_URL from Dockerfile (pass via Coolify env)
- Genericize client API error messages to not leak data structure
- Update .env.example with all required variables including INTERNAL_SECRET

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-22 14:36:16 +02:00
Simone Cavalli 6b5609b0cb feat(01-01): install Drizzle ORM, postgres-js, and configure DB client 
- drizzle-orm@0.45.2 + postgres@3.4.9 installed (postgres-js driver)
- drizzle-kit@0.31.10 installed as dev dependency
- nanoid@5, zod@4, react-hook-form, @hookform/resolvers installed
- src/db/index.ts: Drizzle client initialized with postgres-js driver
- drizzle.config.ts: configured for postgresql dialect + src/db/schema.ts
- .env.example: added as public template (no secrets)
- .gitignore: allow .env.example while blocking all other .env* files
 2026-05-13 15:30:53 +02:00